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Abstract 
This article examines the influence of early exposure to advanced markets of the 
United States and Germany in the growth and internaio lization of healthcare firms 
from Spain, a late industrialized country. Based on the case studies of the Spanish 
corporations Grifols and Ferrer, the study shows that early exposure to advanced markets 
helped them grow in their national markets, and in the world healthcare industry. It shows 
further that the specific capabilities developed by both firms were determined by path-
dependent networks with scientists and institutions, on the one hand; and strategic 















The successful development of American multinationals, the globalization of old 
European groups after World War II, and the oligopolistic structure of the healthcare  
industry have in f luenced our  percept ion of  th is indust ry in  general  and 
the growth and internationalization of the first movers in particular.1 According to 
Alfred D. Chandler Jr, a relatively small number of first movers in the most developed 
countries defined one century ago the evolving pathw ys of learning in the 
pharmaceutical industry, creating: barriers to entry, strategic boundaries, and limits to 
growth. The barriers set by first movers would have be n so high that according to 
Chandler after the 1920s, in the group of the thirty largest pharmaceutical companies he 
identified in the most developed markets, no new pharmaceutical enterprise was able 
successfully to enter their industry (Chandler 2005, 9). The first movers grew in scale 
and scope, and their size and their control of new learning bases in the industry would, 
therefore, have made them dominate for a century global health care markets, and would 
have contributed to prevent that new challengers, and new scientific findings, could 
change the bases of the industry.2  
Small players from late industrialized countries, would have therefore face huge 
disadvantages that may have hampered their opportunities to challenge the supremacy of 
traditional global leaders from the most developed markets. And yet, there are some 
examples of firms from these countries that, somehow, have been able to thrive in this 
environment, climbing to leadership positions in this industry. Obviously, the rise of 
global leaders from emerging and middle income countries is not a phenomenon 
exclusive to healthcare, but to all industries.3 However, the huge path dependent 
differences in capabilities for growth and internationalization in healthcare as compared 
to other industries, as suggested in studies about the pharmaceutical industry (Chandler 
2005), make the study of the mechanisms of entry of small players from latecomer 
markets is field extremely interesting. This article wants to be a contribution to the scarce 
literature that exists, in the business history research field, about the process through 
which a small company from the periphery can become a global leader.4 Our research 
sheds new light on the growth and globalization of small players in the health care 
industries born in late industrialized countries, aking how small companies in this 
environment, with weak or unstable institutional support, have been able to enter the 
major league of the health care industries, and scale positions to the top levels. Our 
hypothesis is that, in the healthcare industries, early exposure to advanced markets, and 
alliances with first movers, may provide these firms with capabilities to grow and be able 
to cross entry barriers in developed markets. We use in-depth case studies  to test this 
hypothesis and provide arguments which future reseach may confirm.  
More specifically, we propose a comparative exercis in which we examine the long 
term transformation of two small Spanish companies into such global players: Grifols 
and Ferrer. Both companies were selected because they operate in different branches of 
the healthcare industries, but in a similar environme t, in order to test the hypothesis. 
Whereas Grifols (founded in 1910/1940) ranks third among the top corporations in the 
world plasma industry, and Ferrer (founded in 1925/19 3) is a middle sized 
pharmaceutical company (5th in Spain and 65th in Europe) The plasma industry´s key 
asset is the ownership of high quality raw material and manufacturing and distribution 
processes, whereas the pharmaceutical industry´s ke asset is the ownership of brands, 
licenses, and patents of a vast portfolio of products and processes. The analysis of their 
growth and internationalization strategies in the second half of the twentieth century in 
this article concludes that despite the differences th ir early exposure to North American 
and German first movers in their respective industrie  was essential to help small firms 
achieve scale and scope, develop their own learning bases, innovate, diversify their 
financial bases, and be able to enter global health c re markets. The empirical analysis 
of this process has revealed, moreover, that the main st ges of this evolution follows the 
chronology suggested by Chandler for the first movers of the pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries in Western Europe and the United States. Between the late nineteenth 
century and early 1920s core firms created their integrated learning bases in production 
and marketing; during the interwar years and World War II companies strengthened their 
capabilities and grew in parallel with the “ therapeutic revolution” and the cascade of
discoveries linked to penicillin, sulfa drugs, and other health care products developed in 
war times. In the 1960s and 1970s first movers concentrated in their core businesses to 
expand production and sales at home and a broad becoming global enterprises, and 
setting entry barriers to challengers to their industries and markets. After the 1970s new 
biological and medical findings and new manageurial approaches would have created a 
new wave of new start ups building up their learning basis and entry barriers (Chandler 
2005). 
Over the last four decades accelerated growth and globalization have shaped the 
healthcare industries in Europe, the United States, and Japan.5 At the same time, tTheir 
technological and scientific innovations have contributed significantly to improve life 
expectancy and reduce inequality in well-being worldwide.6 In line with this global 
growth, pharmaceutical firms from Spain have increased progressively the number of 
their international operations since the late 1980s7. An interesting feature of latecomer 
multinationals, a label for which Spanish MNEs qualify, is that the most dynamic ones 
usually follow a dual path in their international expansion. On the one hand, they expand 
into more developed countries with the aim of upgrading their capabilities and catch up 
with their more advanced competitors. On the other hand, they look for less developed 
countries to exploit their experience and intangible assets. For the last three decades that, 
for pharma companies, entering into an advanced country is associated to being a most 
active player in the international arena than those not entering into these countries.8 Not 
only firms investing in advanced countries had undertak n more international operations; 
they had also a higher propensity to expand aggressively (i.e. without partners) than the 
firms not entering into these countries.  
This article provides a long-term analysis to demonstrate the influence that early 
imprinting from leaders of advanced economies have had in the growth and 
international expansion of two small labs of Spain. The article argues that networks and 
alliances with health care leaders of pioneering German and US corporations 
encouraged early imprinting of strategic resources needed to grow and be a global firm: 
scientific, organizational, and market knowledge.  
The evidences of this article indicate that this was not a straightforward process, 
and that there were many difficulties within the firms, and in the relationship of the 
firms with the external institutional environment and their competitors. The history of 
the international expansion of Grifols and Ferrer in advanced markets shows that it was 
preceded by a decades-long process of networking, technology transfer and capability 
building. This process would allow both firms to use the opportunities provided by 
globalization and to overcome entry barriers in healt c re markets of developed 
economies.  
In the following sections we first provide a synthetic view about the long term 
evolution of the Spanish healthcare industries, within he historical framework proposed 
by Alfred D. Chandler.9 Then, we examine the processes of imprinting and 
internationalization of Grifols and Ferrer in each of the three Chandlerian stages (1880s-
1920s, 1930s-1980s, 1990-present). Finally, a concluding section summarizes the main 
findings of our comparative exercise.  
 
Dynamics of the Healthcare Industries 
From a technological and institutional perspective, th  foundations of the healthcare 
industries are more than a century old. Chandler identified three big waves of 
technological and scientific therapeutic revolutions under the lead of a handful of 
corporations from the United States and Western Europe: the first movers. These waves 
are briefly characterized in Figure 1. How did firms raised outside the historical core of 
large and innovative corporations build their capabilities and go international? 
Recent studies on the pharmaceutical and biomedical industries in peripheral markets 
suggest that neutrality during the two world wars and the technological convergence 
that took place during the golden age accelerated th  transfer of old and new scientific 
and technological innovations to the rest of the world.10 Figure 2 reveals that in Spain 
small firms exposed since the late 19th century to advanced markets were able to 
develop the learning bases of the new scientific and e gineering knowledge by 
combining resources obtained from local and regional systems of innovation with 
resources from networks established with first movers from Germany and the 
United States.  
The Spanish health industry borrowed extensively and learnt from the first 
movers, particularly from the two countries that were l ading the second industrialization 
wave (Germany and US) between the 1880s and 1980s through four major channels: 
foreign trade; Spanish subsidiaries of, and joint ventures with, foreign MNEs; 
cooperative environment and US technical assistance. These four channels helped build 
bridges and networks in both directions.  
The connection was first established to import goods and knowledge very scarce 
and expensive to obtain in Spain during a century, since the end of the 19th century, until 
the late 1980s.11 Changes in the management of the small laboratories in the 1980s 
transferred through previous channels with leading US and German corporations a new 
type of knowledge, manageurial and financial knowledge, that helped achieve scale and 
scope, and the globalization, of both corporations, between the 1980s and the first years 
of the 21rst century. Foreign multinationals did not aim to transfer strategic knowledge 
that allowed for import substitution strategies of their Spanish partners, but the 
accumulation of knowledge and networks inevitably provided such knowledge, 
particularly if the results were profitable to both sides, as it was the case in the history of 
Grifols and Ferrer. This is the process analysed in the following sections, that follow the 
Chandlerian chronology of the evolution of modern pharmaceutical and chemical 
corporations from leading economies. 
 
Early imprinting from first movers of advanced economies. The internationalization 
of Grifols and Ferrer International  
After the end of the Spanish civil war in 1939 the State changed the rules of the game for 
the health care industries in the country until the lat  1970s. The different governments 
created in those decades: a new mandatory public health insurance for all Spaniards in 
the early 1940s; new central public agencies to regulate medical and pharmaceutical 
services and products that increased public social spending (that after the 1950s 
represented a substantial growth in public health spending with the construction of new 
large centralized hospitals); regulations fixing the number of new pharmacies that could 
open in the market; and regulations fixing pharmaceuti al prices between 1963 until 
1975. This situation represented great incentives for national and foreign pharmaceutical 
large corporations, and a rapid growth in the demand of hospital supply equipment, that 
until the late 1970s yielded large profits to a few big national producers and to many big 
foreign US and Western European multinationals. Spain was experimenting the baby 
boom years and the institutional conditions protected salaried workers and their massive 
access to health care products and services through p blic and private insurance 
companies (Pons and Vilar 2014; Chaqués 1999).  
Grifols and Ferrer were two typical small labs that started their family activities 
in this context. Small firms were in disadvantage in the Spanish health care market. 
Foreign currency to pay imported raw materials or equipment was not easily available to 
them, and public bids for the construction or supply of the new large hospitals were often 
won by a few large companies with privileged connections in Madrid, the center of 
regulating agencies. their production was different and had different implications in terms 
of the strategies of alliance to develop in coming decades. Both were born in Barcelona, 
in close connection with the scientific and research centers of Medicine and Pharmacy 
that had traditional networks with leading researche s and centers of Western European 
countries. They were different, though. Grifols specialized in blood products, and Ferrer 
in pharmaceutical drugs. Whereas the plasma industry depends on stable and large 
supplies of high quality raw material, the pharmaceuti al industry needs to invest heavily 
in marketing and patented/licensed innovation. For these reasons, in the last 25 years 
Grifols has relied on mergers and acquisitions in their internationalization process, far 
more than Ferrer, which has resorted to strategic alliances in the research and marketing 
areas.  
The resources and skills both companies used to go abroad had a long history of creation, 
and originated in a similar environment, which fitsbroadly speaking Chandler´s proposed 
chronology of evolution of modern corporations in other more advanced economies. 
 
The embeddedness in local systems of innovation in the healthcare industries in 
Barcelona, 1880s-1920s 
The Spanish health system experienced remarkable progress in the early decades of the 
20th century, laying the foundation of modern public health policy and institutions.12 This 
modernization effort was supported by knowledge originated in the advanced European 
nations as well as by the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, among 
others.13 Barcelona was a city where demographic, industrial, and scientific changes had 
combined to create an advance health care district in Spain between the 1880s and the 
early 1930s.14 In this favorable local context small enterprises in the clinical analysis 
activity, in the production of pharmaceutical drugs, and in the private surgical activity 
appeared, led by professionals of the M dicine and the Pharmaceutical local Faculties 
flourished.15 Our two firms participated in this dynamic environment in different ways.  
Grifols, in the creation of outward-looking clinical l bs (in 1910, 1940) and the first civil 
Spanish blood bank (1945) . Ferrer, in the creation of outward-looking pharmaceutical 
labs (1925). 
Grifols archive preserves newspapers and books with conference papers of the late 
1920s and early 1930s and 1940s that show the persistent activity of learning updated 
news of German, French, Italian, and British scientists in the field of clinical analysis 
(Grifols Historical Archive in Barcelona. Newspapers section and Library). Josep Antoni 
Grifols Morera graduated in Medicine from the University of Barcelona in 1889, and his 
son, José Antonio Grifols Roig, would study Medicine too. Upon his graduation in 1909, 
he undertook a life changing travel to Danzig and Munich, where he specialized in 
pathology and lab practice. Back in his home town, he founded a small clinical laboratory 
-Instituto Central de Análisis Clínicos- with Drs. Celis, Moragas and Gordan. In 1925 one 
of Grifols’ German collegues, Dr. Helmut Hempel, who was fleeing inter-war Germany, 
joined the Barcelona laboratory. In the 1920s, much of the laboratory’s work focused on 
syphilis and other infectious diseases. It did not take long for the third generation, Victor 
and José Antonio Grifols Lucas, to start helping their father to conduct urine tests and 
count white blood cells. An example of science-based dynastic family firm. 
In contrast, the origins of Ferrer provide an insight into the commercial and 
industrial atmosphereof Barcelona. Medir, Ferrer y Cía, Ferrer’sforerunner, wasfounded
in 1925.16 It was one of the many partnerships established at the time to seize the 
opportunities of importing drugs from the most advanced countries and serving the 
growing Spanish urban population. International networking and modern marketing were 
to play a relevant role in the development of Ferrer International.  
In this stage both small labs were run by outward looking entrepreneurs with 
scientific education, fluent in foreign languages, and with an embedded strategy of 
keeping a regular knowledge of news from leading centers and companies in their 
different market niches of clinical analysis, and pharmaceutical drugs over the counter. 
New organizational and commercial knowledge from the United States and Germany 
and growth in scale and scope, 1930s-1990s 
In this second stage both labs had to adapt to a cycle of collapse and slow 
reconstruction and late international integration in their traditional activities in 
their home markets due to the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), Franco´s dictatorship 
(1940-1975) and the international orientation of the new democratic governments 
after 1975, which imposed a long period of strict lmitations to foreign trade and 
knowledge transfer, and therefore a common framework f difficulties to 
maintain former links with European firms. After World War II both labs 
struggled to maintain contacts with European firms and scientific institutes and 
congresses, and would focus their scarce resources in importing knowledge, and 
establishing alliances, with firms and centers from the three economies that 
seemed to be dominating innovation and world markets in the most knowledge 
intensive products and processes: Germany, the United S ates, and Japan.  
The changing environment, and the new contacts, requi d organizational 
changes in both labs, to grow and design new internatio alization strategies. In 
the case of Grifols, during World War II a German Jewish doctor, Dr. Oppenheimer, 
who had escaped from nazi Germany, came to work to the Grifols laboratory. The 
German staff continued to help Grifols keeping up to date with the latest discoveries in 
microbiology and blood testing. The Civil War in Spain (1936-1939) provided the 
Grifols family with a new learning experience: both Grifols Lucas brothers went to work 
at Spain’s first blood bank, where they learnt to treat and classify donors, preserve and
re-use blood and send it to distant locations within e Republican zone. Shortly after 
the war, in 1940, 55 year old Grifols Roig embarked on the foundation of Laboratorios 
Grifols with his and his wife’s capital. His two sons resumed their studies, graduating
in Chemistry and Pharmacy and joining the family lab. In 1946 Victor Grifols Lucas 
went to England to study penicillin production and visit two of his father´s Catalan 
exiled friends, Dr. Trueta in Oxford and Dr. Duran in Manchester.  
Grifols had a new patent, a new market, talented sons, a loyal local and German 
staff, and long-term capital from local networks. It seemed the right time to find 
appropriate foreign partners. The Grifols Lucas found it first in Dr. Robert Race of the 
Lister Institute. Race, who had established the structu e of the human chromosome 
related to the RH system, was invited to Barcelona a d he agreed to cooperate with 
Grifols on analysis-related matters. The Grifols sought to enter the specialized market 
niche of plasma fractionation, which they achieved in 1956. Given Spain’s poor
international reputation, it was very difficult for Grifols to sell plasma outside the 
Spanish market. They found away: selling it under thecustomer’s brand.17  
For serums and reagents, friendship with a Barcelona pharmacist, Dr. Roca 
Vinyals, helped connect Laboratorios Grifols with the North American company Dade 
Reagents in Spain that allowed Grifols to export plasma and import their reagents. Dade´s 
top management, Dr. Griffitts and Mr. Potts suggested incorporating a joint venture 
company, Dade Grifols, half owned by Dade Reagents, and half owned by the Roca de 
Vinyals and the Grifols family. The company was one of the most profitable business 
experiences in the history of Grifols. New products much in demand in the Spanish health 
system (cardiovascular products and lab equipment particularly), with the new capital and 
managerial advice contributed by the North American p rtners, and in-site training in the 
North American factories opened up a new period in the history of the labs.18 Three 
women would play a very relevant role in launching initiatives that would consolidate the 
scientific reputation of Dade Grifols: María Cristina Cadira (co-manager of Dade Grifols, 
sister of Roca de Vinyals´s widow), Julia Mas (Director of the immuhemathology lab) 
and Montserrat Viñals (Chemistry graduate, Technical Director of Dade-Grifols, and wife 
of Grifols commercial top manager between the 1950s and the 1970s Antonio Ruiz).19 It 
was the beginning of new times, the alliance in 1960 of a small biopharmaceutical 
company of Barcelona with a North American pioneering giant in the clinical laboratories 
industries.  
The mid 1950s until the early 1980s were therefore decades of fruitful cooperation 
of the small Grifols lab with two North American partners, first Dade Reagents 
(1957/1960-1965) and then American Hospital Supply Corporation (1966-1982) that 
allowed growth and conquest of the Spanish market, a strong import activity of US 
products and managerial practices, and a few (almost symbolic) exports of small 
quantities of their products to European markets (Germany, and Switzerland in the 50s, 
Sweden in the 60s) and the United States.20 Sales within Europe in the 1950s and 1960s 
were basically of the same type as they had been within Spain in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, maquila style: Grifols sold to other labs with prestigious names (vaccines and 
penicillin to Sociedad General de Farmacia and gamm globulin to Hubber in Spain, 
blood to Swiss Red Cross, gamma globulin to the Swedish Kabi), and those labs added 
their brands on the products before reaching their final client. During the mid 1950s, and 
particularly after the association with Dade Reagents a d with American Hospital Supply 
Corporation, exports of plasma to the United States followed strict transparent rules 
which allowed for greater visibility of the Grifols brand and products in the US market, 
and in the Food and Drugs Administration. This increased indeed sales, and reputation.  
The friendship of Grifols Lucas with Guillermo Anido, innovation manager in Dade 
Reagents and in American Hospital Supply Corporation, and the opportunity to send 
Spanish staff to a US corporation where Spanish speaking Cubans arrived from the exile, 
and highly qualified in lab techniques and quality control, was a lucky opportunity that 
allowed Grifols to send their own patents to be considered for exploitation in the US 
market, and to export plasma to the United States.. 21  
A regulatory change would stop this promising path, nd required reinforcing the 
alliance with the US partner: the Spanish Government prohibited the export of blood, in 
1965, and exports sharply declined from 3.3 million Spanish pesetas in 1965 to 917,000 
pesetas in 1966. The domestic market had to be the solution to survive, in a compulsory 
reconquest of Spanish markets, with sales increasing from 875,000 pesetas in 1965 to 2.2 
million pesetas in 1966. The US partnership Dade Grifols decisively helped in this 
reconquest, providing new exclusive products for hospital consumption, and training in 
US manageurial practices typical of a large Chandlerian corporation. Sales and profits 
account for the great support provided by the joint partnership. Quantitatively speaking, 
in 1966 the sales (59.2 millons of Spanish pesetas) of this joint partnership with a US 
corporation were approximately thirty times bigger than the sales of the other two firms 
of the Grifols group Laboratorios Grifols (2.2 million pesetas) and Gri-Cel (less than 1 
million) that very same year.22 Profits of Dade Grifols were around three to eight times 
the average profits of Laboratorios Grifols and Gri-Cel during the first three years of the 
1970s, the only ones for which information has been able to be found after the loss of the 
Dade Grifols archive when they merged with Baxter Travenol in the mid 1980s.23 
There were a few weaknesses in the years of transformation of the small lab and 
blood bank into an industrial holding, between the mid 1950s and the mid 1970s. On the 
productive side: lack of productivity; accumulation f stocks for lack of coordination 
between production and the commercial network of sales gents; expenses and costs to 
train technical staff in labs and in the sales network; lack of security in the infrastructures 
(a fire in September 1967 in the lab of Chemistry); informal supply of machinery and 
other productive elements needed to maintain the buildings and organize the post-sales 
services. In the distribution side: lack of specialized and standardized training of the sales 
network; difficulties to plan sales abroad due to changes in regulatory framework 
(prohibition of blood exports in 1965, regulation of prices by the Spanish Ministry of 
Health in the 1970s-90s); lack of internal statistics of sales to coordinate with production 
departments and avoid accumulation of stocks. In management, disorganized sales 
network and lack of experience in coordinating production departments and sales 
network.24 The external context of rampant inflation of the country during the 1970s 
increased expenses in human resources, raw materials, services, and reduced profit 
margins of the sales. Some products had constant losses but were maintained to preserve 
reputation and avoid losing clients. The excellent evolution of the sales were, therefore, 
not a good simple indicator of what was going inside the company in these years of 
growth.25  
The solution came with scale and scope following US models of factories. The 
Grifols family decided to build a brand new US style factory in Parets del Vallés (land 
was bought in 1966, factory built in 1970) with plenty of space to create a large 
standardized building that followed all the requirements of the US Food and Drug 
Administration in order to be an acceptable production center whose products could one 
day be registered in the US market, to compete with US corporations. It was an ambitious 
dream, and it would be American Hospital Supply Corporation, where Dade Reagents 
merged in the mid 1960s, a pioneering company in hospital equipment that would helped 
them with an alliance. From the mid 1960s until the mid 1980s AHS Corp. was to be not 
just a commercial partner for the Grifols firms, but also a business school of good 
practices in the health industries in order to learn how the best corporations produced and 
sold in the US and the global markets. AHS staff would greatly help in the planning, 
design, construction, and lay-out of the new building. Several trips to the different centers 
of AHS in the United States followed: to Miami in 1961 by Victor Grifols Lucas, Victor 
Grifols Roura in 1974 and other technical managers travelled in 1978 to Miami, Houston, 
Chicago, Evanston, Philadelphia, and Washington.26 The partnership with AHS allowed 
the Grifols company to learn new lay-outs, new financi l and technical practices, and 
establish contacts with relevant authorities, like th Secretary of Health Mr. O´Keffe in 
March 1978. Sales and profits multiplied as well. Profits rose in 1975 from 7.3 million 
euros to 286 million euros in 1986, the golden age of the partnership of Grifols with AHS 
Corp. Americans had helped the Spaniards to acquire the strategic resources in terms of 
creation, and the management, of a large corporation in the health industries, and also 
much needed long-term stable capital that the Grifols needed to overcome the serious 
weaknesses the lab had had during the 1950s and 1960s. 
A new generation participated in the new times. Victor Grifols Roura had joined 
in 1973 the company in the commercial department, and learnt very closely from AHS, 
and from his father and technical staff, how to runthe US style Parets factory. He had 
been travelling to the United States and supervised th  launch of the internationalization 
of the company, with the establishment of exports with China in 1983-1985, the first 
subsidiaries in Portugal in 1988, and in Argentina, Chile and Mexico in the early 1990s. 
He was well acquainted with the problems of the globa  health industries, and was trained 
in business administration in high quality local inst tutions. Grifols Roura, as the internal 
bulletins testify, was a tough manager who stubbornly wanted to impose the highest 
standards of quality and professionalism in all leve s of the group, in close coordination 
with the North American, Japanese, and Spanish shareholders and staff. When he entered 
the Board with all the responsibilities formerly held by his father, in December of 1985, 
he was well prepared to use the accumulated resources and know how to study what 
would be, with Alpha Therapeutic Corporation until the late 1990s, and afterwards with 
a diversity of long-term investors at home and abrod, a period of spectacular acquisitions 
in Europe, Asia, and above all the United States.27  
Like Grifols, Ferrer had its beginnings in the industrial and scientific milieu of 
early 20th-century Barcelona and was strongly influenced by the talents, background and 
social networks of its founders and managers, basing its growth on alliances with leading 
international companies. The company’s origins in the commercialization of imported
chemical and pharmaceutical products would determine the focus and capabilities of 
Ferrer. The Ferrer family had seized control of Medir, Ferrer y Cía SRC at the death of 
their senior partner, and created two new companies, Manuel y Francisco Ferrer SL 
(1940) and Laboratorios Ferrer SL (1953), to take advantage of post-war Spain’s
nationalistic industrial policy. By then the second generation, second cousins Carlos 
Ferrer Salat and Jordi Ferrer Batlles, a chemical engin er and a pharmacist respectively, 
took over. The company continued to manufacture under foreign licenses and to represent 
foreign multinationals, but it also diversified into he food industry.28 Since the 1960s 
Ferrer Salat became deeply involved in the modernization of the Spanish economy, 
playing a major role in the democratization of Spanish employers’ associations, and
lobbying for Spain’s full integration into Europe and the dissemination of free market
economics and social dialogue in post-Franco Spain.29  
The growth and internationalization of Ferrer would be nurtured by this context. 
The most decisive change took place in the 1970s. 30 Jordi Ferrer sold his share of the 
company (40%). Lacking sufficient purchasing power himself, Ferrer Salat turned to 
another cousin, the financier Josep Vilarasau, to the new local industrial banks (Banco 
Industrial de Cataluña, founded in 1968, and Banco Catalan de Desarrollo, founded in 
1964), and to a few private investors, all of them connected with Ferrer Salat’s
institutional initiatives. This type of investment network had been common in Catalonia 
since the beginning of industrialization.  
In 1974, Ferrer Salat asked Rafael Foguet to replac him as CEO. Foguet was a 
chemist whose entire career had been spent with a leading Spanish chemical group Cros. 
His experience at Cros had been highly formative: in the building of an industrial group 
and in the lessons he learned from Cros’sinternational partnersHoechst, Wacker Chemie,
Occidental-Hooker, Standard Oil, Shell, ICI, Dupont a d Progil.31 German and North-
American know-how of organization and international operations. As in Grifols, these 
partners transferred much more than products, they transferred manageurial and 
organizational models of production, commercialization typical of large pioneering 
corporations in knowledge-intensive industries. 
At Cros Foguet had relentlessly promoted the diversificat on characteristic of 
industrial groups through the acquisition of firms working in more technologically 
advanced fields and the establishment of three resea ch centers. Foguet demanded 
abundant financial resources and a hierarchical organization. It was no easy task. Foguet 
found himself saddled with a family-run firm that was still digesting the recent acquisition 
of another family-run firm, Robert, and “a daring mini-presence abroad” in three
countries: Peru and Mexico, where Ferrer had established subsidiaries (d dicated mainly 
to product packaging under the brand name Novag) in 1961 and 1967, respectively; and 
Germany, where Ferrer had just acquired the pharmaceutical laboratory Trommsdorff.32 
In terms of research, Ferrer had little more than “a laboratory of incremental R&D that 
had achieved some recognition for producing esters and salts that improved the 
therapeutic properties of certain active ingredients” .33  
As in the case of Grifols, to transform Ferrer into an industrial group and promote 
innovation, required to exploit synergies and modernize the company’s laboratories and
production facilities.34 The new CEO replaced the existing structure, very informal, by a 
pyramidal and centralized model, with himself in contr l of the financial, human 
resources and research areas and periodic meetings with the department heads. The new 
structure required a legal change (incorporation), a new name (Ferrer Internacional) and 
the long-term objective of consolidation, something that would not be achieved until 
1996. Between 1975 and 1996, Ferrer Internacional experienced exponential growth 
based on new products of chemical and pharmaceutical research, developed individually 
or jointly; new process and product technology; the adaptation of products to international 
norms; advances in safety and environmental issues; int rnationalization; diversification 
of activities into similar or complementary areas; and the training of management staff 
by area. In 1978 Ferrer had become a group in technical, legal and administrative terms. 
And it was clear that innovation was subordinated to commercialization. Diversification 
would involve the acquisition of companies working  fine chemistry, diagnostics, food 
products, dermopharmacy, nutriceuticals, and specialti s. New activities such as food, 
aromas and diagnostics required their own facilities and development laboratories, as well 
as specific methods of production, control and distribu ion. Diversification reached the 
research area, which was structured into six specific R&D centers, five of them in the 
Barcelona area. 
Acquisitions provided organizational knowledge for the renewal of the production 
facilities, and the management organization, but also commercial platforms of global 
markets, as in Grifols. The purchase of Trommsdorff by Ferrer was a great opportunity 
identified by Ferrer Salat during one of his many iternational trips. Founded in 1795 in 
Erfurt and rebuilt in Aachen after the Second World War, Trommsdorff was a small yet 
highly respected company. In 1970 Trommsdorff was controlled by the Fossen and 
Hüllen families, who were coping with falling sales (from 20 million to 3-4 million DM) 
due to the recent discovery of negative side effects in its leading product, the stomach 
protector Rabro. Ferrer Salat purchased 50 per cent of Trommsdorff in exchange for 20 
per cent of Ferrer. As Trommsdorff’s financial situation continued to worsen, Ferrer,
already an activeboard member, set thestage for Ferrer’s 100 per cent acquisition of the 
German firm. In less than a decade, Ferrer had engaged in a dual path of 
internationalization. According to Foguet, Ferrer aimed to integrate Trommsdorff into the 
group’snew structureasameansof achieving internationalization in marketswhich were
more demanding, but also more stable, than those of Latin America.  
As with Grifols, Spain’s poor international reputation and country image posed a 
problem. The company decided to “hide” their Spanish background behind a German 
brand, but hired Spanish managers at Trommsdorff. Trommsdorff experienced a 
remarkable growth, doubling its staff to around 250 and increasing its productivity to 
twice that of Ferrer’s Barcelona facilities. The German subsidiary became focused on
four therapeutic areas: cardiovascular, anti-bacterial, dermatological and pneumological. 
Although Trommsdorff’ s research center was small and more oriented toward
development than research, Ferrer sought from the very beginning to widen its activities 
by establishing collaborations with German research centers.  
As in the case of Grifols´early exposure to German and US markets, Ferrer’searly
exposure to the German market provided valuable lessons for the international expansion 
over the next four decades.35 Ferrer, like Grifols, learnt that advanced markets r quired 
to deal with regulatory, technical and commercial issues; that they might be difficult to 
enter, but a safer bet in the long run. Further they learnt that industrial subsidiaries in 
countries such as Germany benefitted from both their industrial tradition and the prestige 
of the country, which provided an export platform. Finally, as in Grifols, Ferrer realized 
that to maintain a uniform group strategy, foreign subsidiaries must be effectively 
controlled through the group CEO and the director of the international division. This is 
the model that Ferrer tried to implement in the over twenty international subsidiaries 
established before 1996. Having a German laboratory in the heart of Europe did allow 
Ferrer to create commercial subsidiaries all over th  continent (Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Belgium and Ireland), to gain access to the Austrian market, to establish a subsidiary in 
Hong-Kong and, most crucially, to gain knowledge about advanced markets and acquire 
a solid global vision.  
Concerted research, still unusual in Spain in the 1970s, replaced the traditional 
scheme of a sovereign researcher that had characterized Ferrer since the 1950s.36 In 
addition, the new research center, staffed by circa 50 people, half of them university 
graduates, was kept separate from the factory and managed through a system of weekly 
meetings with the CEO and reports from each department of Ferrer Internacional. Foguet 
quickly sought to establish enduring relations with Spain’s public and private research
institutions and, in 1982, with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).37 A 
medical doctor by training, Dr. Ortiz had worked for Sandoz and Hobson and Infar 
Natterman and helped design Spain’s new regulatory framework before joining Ferrer.38  
Over the next three decades, the size of the research center tripled. Most projects 
would be conducted in cooperation with researchers specialized in clinical pharmacology 
or with hospitals to test particular drugs before obtaining their official medical 
registration.39 A familiarization with foreign systems of research and registration did 
facilitate internationalization in all of its dimensions (licensing in and out). The 
hierarchical organizational model implemented in 1975 included “a precise, dynamic
system of follow-up, with objective parameters and i icators and controlled by the 
company’s decision-makers” .40 Finally, since 1984 the Ferrer Research Foundation and 
the Severo Ochoa Award for Biomedical Research haveelped to give visibility to Ferrer 
inside and outside Spain.41  
In both cases, the early imprinting of knowledge obtained in the first stage was 
maintained in the second stage of growth, but changed the scale and scope between the 
1930s and 1990s. The growth of national and internaio l demand of health care products 
required, in both, to adapt to difficulties stemming from common institutional changes 
and the existence of foreign giants whose products were massively sold in the Spanish 
market. Both firms could have disappeared, as many other small labs, in this second stage 
of development of their businesses, in front of the difficulties, but both labs had managers 
and owners who foresaw a possible option: alliance with foreign giants, instead of just 
surviving in increasingly smaller market niches in the national market. Their dialogue 
with German and US leaders interested in entering the Spanish market was negotiated in 
such a way that both labs used it to improve capabilities and competitiveness in their 
organization, their structure, and their strategies. They learnt from the world giants, to 
become giants at home and slowly abroad in neighboring markets like Portugal or France. 
This stage was, therefore, a period where the earlyimprinting of the previous period was 
carried out to a more grown up mature stage. 
Diverse pathways of expansion in developed markets after the 1990s: Mergers and 
Adquisitions (Grifols) and Strategic Alliances (Ferrer)  
After the 1990s, Grifols and Ferrer were as many other labs able to grow by a race 
of new possibilities to buy abroad. It was a period f frenzy in mergers and 
acquisitions, which privileged investments in advanced markets in Western 
Europe and the United States.  
From the 1990s Gri fols’ goal has been to integrate backwards and forward at
global scale, by controlling the global supply of their raw materials (high quality 
plasma proteins), and in this way the most dynamic and profitable global markets 
in their market niche (plasma protein derivatives). With this strategy in mind, 
Grifols accelerated acquisitions in the United States in the early decades of the 
20th century.42 The alliance with the Green Cross Corporation, the Japanese leader 
in plasma products, and with Alpha Therapeutic Corporation (GCC´s North 
American subsidiary) provided technological basis that increased sales in foreign 
markets to 25 per cent of total income, and exports multiplying by four since 1992. 
The subsidiaries provided further experience in inter ational accounts, payments, 
and the export of health and pharmaceutical products: Portugal was the first one 
in 1988, in the Czech Republic in 1990, Slovakia 1999, the Miami Pexaco Intl 
Corp to distribute to Central and South America (except Brazil until 1998) in 1990, 
Chile in 1990, Argentina 1991, Mexico in 1993, Brazil in 1998. A qualitative step 
forward came with the opportunity to buy ATC´s subsidiaries in Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom in the mid 1997: safety problems had collapsed the 
financial future of these subsidiaries, and the Japanese GCC offered Grifols the 
option of purchase of their subsidiaries in these markets previously closed to 
Grifols by Alpha´s commercial interests in Europe. The subsidiary in France came 
in 1999, and in 2003 the acquisition of Alpha´s asset  in the United States made 
Grifols establish headquarters in the US in Los Angeles where Alpha had had 
central offices and plants. The Singapore office opened in 2000, and the 
acquisition of Alpha´s assets in 2003 led to merging with Singapore the 
subsidiaries in Malaysia, and Thailand, serving 15 countries in Asia. In 2001 
Grupo Santander Central Hispano became shareholder f G ifols in order to help 
buy Seracare, a leading plasma supplier in the United States, in 2002. It was the 
first step in acquisitions of companies that had donation centers in the United 
States, to integrate horizontally –and control the quality- of plasma in their 
manufacturing plants. The family Grifols retained 30 per cent, and the corporation 
became listed in the Spanish stock exchange in 2006. Three investments funds led 
by Morgan Stanley replaced Banco Santander Central Hispano and Deutsch Bank 
as main financial partners, in 2005. The third inter ational expansion started with 
subsidiaries in Japan in 2006, in 2009 in China and Switzerland, and in the Nordic 
countries and Colombia in 2010. The core acquisitions after this year have 
concentrated in the US market with Talecris and assets from Novartis Diagnostics 
in 2011 and 2014.43 Today the most important market, and manufacturing plants, 
of the corporation are in the United States, and only 6 percent of sales go to the 
Spanish market. Grifols has more than 70 per cent of its employees in the United 
States, where it has totalled investments for 6,400 million euros (acquisitions and 
expansion of current installations combined), and of the 3,935 million euros in 
sales in 2015 more than 60 per cent were obtained i the North American market.44 
In the case of Ferrer, the group consolidated accounts and organization in 1996, 
but maintained ownership and management under the Ferr r family, with a clear strategy 
of increasing their international presence in leading advanced markets. Their preference 
was Western Europe, in contrast with Grifols´dominant strategy of acquisitions in the 
United States. After Carles Ferrer Salat’s sudden death in 1998, his son Sergi took over.
Two years later, Dr. Ortiz was succeeded by Dr. Joan F nés as R&D director. As for 
Rafael Foguet, he maintained his central role until 2004, being replaced by Dr. Jordi 
Ramentol. Forty years after its sound transformation, Ferrer is still a chemical, 
pharmaceutical and food product group which is vertically integrated, highly diversified 
and strongly commercial (licencing in and out), butwith a more centered R&D strategy 
and a more selective and stable system of alliances. To understand the group’s growth
strategy onehasto pay special attention to Ferrer’s four major partnersasof 2015: Centro 
Nacional de Investigaciones Cardiovasculares (CNIC), Alexza, Histocell and Janus 
Developments.45 Alexza is an American pharmaceutical company specializing in research, 
development and commercialization of innovative products to treat acute and intermittent 
disorders such as asthma or schizophrenia. This alliance allows Ferrer participate in the 
development and marketing of Staccato and Adasuve syst ms, owned by Alexza. As for 
Histocell, it is a Spanish biopharmaceutical company developing cell therapy and tissue 
engineering products for regenerative medicine.46 This alliance has two ongoing projects. 
The first project, aimed at developing a new cell therapy medication for the treatment of 
traumatic spinal cord injuries, marks a completely new strategy for the use of adult stem 
cells. The second focuses on the development of a new drug from the patient’sadult stem
cells and a new biomaterial for clinical application in articular cartilage injuries.  Janus 
Developments is an incubator for biotech start-ups that facilitates collaboration between 
academic research, industry and investors, created in 2009 with the support of Ferrer, 
Enantia and Caixa Manresa.47 Finally, in September 2016 Ferrer has launched an alliance 
with the public research center IBEC and the private company Mind the Byte, both based 
in Barcelona, devoted to the computational development of therapeutic molecules to fight 
cancer metastasis.  
Grifols and Ferrer Internacional remain deeply rooted in the biomedical and 
chemical-pharmaceutical cluster of Barcelona, with slight differences. Grifols has strong 
connections with the research centers of the city, but has concentrated most of his 
scientific staff outside Spain due to their mergers and acquisitions in Europe, America, 
and Asia and the concentration of donor centers and clients in the United States. On the 
other side, Ferrer has a strong marketing and commercial component located in 
Barcelona, and shows a very high percentage of its team trained in Catalan universities. 
Ferrer preferably resorts to Spanish scientists to form scientific committees. Today 
Ferrer’s international network, with 27 subsidiaries, is one of the most extensive of 
Spanish-funded laboratories, even though Ferrer has only two industrial subsidiaries: 
Mexico and Alsdorf. Their function is strictly instrumental: to provide support to and 
increase European and American sales of products which are developed in Barcelona. 
This is coherent with the company’s historical trajectory and with the fact that sales are
concentrated in Europe (66%) and Latin America (21%). Ferrer’s international sales
account for nearly 50% of the group’s total sales. The R&D activity of the foreign
subsidiaries is very modest. However early and daring, Ferrer’s internationalization
remains essentially commercial in nature and, much as it was in the 1970s, a drive to 
widen markets in order to sustain innovation, which takes place in Barcelona. In Grifols, 
with 96 per cent of its sales outside Spain, and sales and employment concentrated in the 
United States, the R&D of foreign subsidiaries is strategic and are concentrated in or 
around its extensive network of donor centers in the United States, and the connected 
factories. Grifols´internationalization is essentially productive in nature, in search of  very 
stable and large high quality markets of raw materils derived from human plasma.  
Both companies started small, but grew large in many ways because of their early 
ties with leading giants from Germany and the United States. The small companies from 
a backward country specialized in an industry which required initially high quality 
knowledge and networks. Both firms accumulated this initial knowledge at home in the 
Barcelona cluster of biomedical scientists born in the late 19th century. Both firms were 
able to grow, following Chandler´s chronology, after the 1930s, but for different reasons 
to those posited by Chandler. Not by establishing barriers to competitors, but by 
establishing networks and alliances with enormous giants who did not see the Spanish 
labs as a threat, but as a target. Once the alliance yielded results, in terms of scale and 
scope and internationalization via foreign trade, the Spanish companies used 
organizational knowledge from those giants to launch, in a favourable period after the 
1990s, their foreign direct investment into the US or Germany, where old labs were being 
sold, or near bankruptcy. In this way, after a century of learning from giants, the small 
firms joined the reduced group of giants in their industry, and started to try to establish, 
as Chandler indicated, entry barriers for other potential followers.  
 
Lessons from History. Final Remarks  
The comparative study of Grifols and Ferrer shows that the olig polistic structure of the 
modern pharmaceutical industry did not stop firms ba ed in late industrialized countries 
from developing their own organizational and innovation capabilities throughout the 20th 
century and going global since the 1990s. Personal a d institutional networks played a 
crucial role in the long and effective learning strategies of both multinationals. And early 
international imprinting from advanced countries accelerated the formation of specific, 
combinative capabilities.  
Six conclusions emerge from our comparative exercis. First, both Grifols and 
Ferrer established early contacts with incumbents from more developed countries, 
contacts which provided knowledge, networks, and entrepreneurial attitudes oriented 
to embed innovative strategies and structures in their small companies in the early 
20th century. The Grifols travelled, studied or worked in German clinical labs in the 
first three decades of the twentieth century, keeping in touch in those early years with 
the most modern techniques to organize clinical labs for diagnosis that will develop 
in the world after World War II. Ferrer´s internationalization in pharmaceutical 
products started a close link with German markets, also learning German 
organizational routines in the pharmaceutical industry in the 1960s. In both companies 
import activities and distribution of products of corporations from developed 
economies, leaders in innovation, contributed to their learning and training with 
international players. A great share of the profits of Grifols and Ferrer since the 1950s 
until the 1970s came from the import and distribution n Spain of specialties from 
advanced countries, a crucial activity to achieve and sustain international 
competitiveness over time. 
Second, in both companies leading scientists of thefounding family 
institutionalized innovative scientific routines in their companies before the 1970s, and 
in both companies a change took place after the 1970s when professional managers with 
a German and/or American background occupied CEO positions and led an accelerated 
era of foreign investments and exports: Victor Grifols Roura in Grifols and Rafael 
Foguet in Ferrer.  
Third, both corporations made this transition from a science-managed firm to a 
business-oriented global corporation with culturally hybrid entrepreneurs and 
managers.48 Culturally-hybrid entrepreneurs and managers possessed a rare, valuable 
intangible experience: they had successful command of how to combine 
organizational knowledge of late developed markets, with organizational knowledge 
of developed markets. In Grifols there were several family members with this 
intangible asset difficult to find in Spain before the 1980s (the founder, the sons, and 
the grandsons) and members of their social network (the Cuban-American Guillermo 
Anido innovation manager in the US Dade Reagents and American Hospital Supply 
Corp, and Hikosuke Yorihiro, the Japanese C.E.O. of Alpha Therapeutic 
Corporation). In Ferrer, the founder Ferrer and Rafael Foguet. Grifols accumulated 
these networks and knowledge through travels, scientific congresses, and import 
activities with France and Germany before the 1940s, the United Kingdom in the second 
half of the 1940s, and above all with the US since the 1950s, and U.S. and Japan after 
the 1980s.  
Fourth, the stage of development in which the transformation of a small lab into 
a vertically integrated industrial group took place had profound and lasting effects on 
corporate development and R&D. It is important to underline the relationship between 
internationalization and innovation, with the former always serving the latter in the two 
cases. The long training received by Grifols during their alliances and joint-ventures 
with three North American corporations between the late 1950s and 1998 was essential 
to understand their self-confidence and their speed in mergers and acquisitions in the 
world after the 1990s. Similarly, Ferr r’ s history of enduring strong embeddedness in 
the Barcelona biomedical cluster was and remains the key of their international 
competitiveness.  
Fifth, investments in Europe, in the 1970s by Ferrer and the 1980s-90s by 
Grifols, provided the two companies with organizational knowledge about 
international operations, a fundamental resource to increase industrial, commercial, 
and regulatory capabilities within and outside Europe. Trommsdorff’s acquisition 
served well the objective of allowing a modest Spanish pharmaceutical firm to access 
mature markets and increase its industrial, commercial and regulatory capabilities. 
Grifols’s acquisition of the European subsidiaries of the North American Alpha 
Therapeutic Corporation transformed a Spanish-based company into a European 
corporation that became visible as a new global player in the plasma industry after the 
1990s.  
Sixth, private family ownership have not prevented Grifols and Ferrer from going 
international and innovating. Self-financing and strategic alliances have always played 
a major role in both since the mid twentieth century, but Grifols resorted to the local 
bank Sabadell in the 1970s-1980s and to a variety of other Spanish and international 
banks, the stock market and international investors since the 1990s. In contrast, Ferrer, 
which remains a closely held group, resorted to three related local banks to fund its 
ambitious growth plans.  
And finally, the accumulation of social networks useful to expand the market 
niche of the two case studies must be underlined to understand the long-term resilience 
of the two healthcare companies. Both companies were founded by Catalan 
entrepreneurs very connected to centers of scientific excellence at the local and 
international level since their early beginnings until today. Both created enduring social 
networks within their different market niches, without which the transformation of 
small labs into global corporations could not have taken place. Grifols accumulated 
throughout the 20th century close networks with thelocal and global scientific 
community in their two market niches. Ferrer led and participated actively in the 
creation of networks with the local and European elites. In both cases the leadership in 
the creation and participation of networks helped them to participate in the design of 
strategic rules of the game in the Spanish pharmaceutical industry in the case of Ferrer, 
and in the global plasma industry in the case of Grifols.  
Early exposure to advanced markets helped them growoutside, but in dialogue 
with, the oligopolistic structure of the world healthcare industry. It shows further that 
the specific capabilities developed by both firms were determined first of all by personal 
and institutional networks that linked them to advanced research centers since the 1920s. 
And, second, by their acquisitions, mergers, and strategic alliances, that gave them 
access to advanced organizational and global commercial knowledge from leading 
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